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 Minimalism and Expressivism 
  
There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of the 
relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical theory. 
The minimalist theory of truth, developed by Paul Horwich (1998) is a theory of truth the 
central theses of which are: The meaning of ‘true’ is explained fundamentally by the 
acceptance of a trivial schema T:   
T:  <p> is true iff p. 
(In the schema, ‘<p>’ is short for ‘the proposition that p.’). The purpose of the 
notion of truth is to allow the formulation of generalizations such as ‘Everything the 
president said was true’ and ‘All instances of ‘p or not p’ are true’. Truth is a property, but it 
is not a substantial property of the sort that does explanatory work (beyond the fact of 
acceptance of the truth schema).  
One group of philosophers contends that this minimalist theory of truth and 
metaethical expressivism are compatible, the other group contends that such theories are 
incompatible. I will call the former position ‘compatibilism’ and the latter position 
‘incompatiblism.’ The claim that there is such an incompatibility, I will argue, is based on a 
misunderstanding of the historical roots of expressivism, the motivations behind the 
expressivist theory, and the essential commitments of expressivism.  I will present an 
account of the expressivist theory that is clearly consistent with minimalism. It is important 
to note that this is not simply, as it may first seem, a verbal dispute regarding the proper uses 
of the terms ‘minimalism’ and ‘expressivism.’  Any such dispute would be of little theoretical 
interest.  The concern that I will address in this paper is a substantive one.  Opponents of 
the compatibilist position have incorrectly overlooked a possible philosophical position.  
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Regardless of the labels applied to such philosophical positions, the very possibility of these 
positions being correct ought not to be denied without sufficient argument and 
consideration of the complete array of metaethical views in logical space.        
Are Minimalism and Expressivism Compatible? 
Paul Boghossian (1990), Crispin Wright (1985, 1992, 1996), and John Divers and 
Alexander Miller (1994) have argued that the minimalist account of truth is incompatible 
with the expressivist theory of morality, the proponents of which traditionally have held that 
moral utterances are neither true nor false. The apparent difficulty here results from the view 
that the expressivist, in order to distinguish her view from those who hold distinct 
metaethical positions, must hold the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false.  I 
will call this view of moral truth the ‘Denial Thesis.’  Philosophers whose views were 
ancestors of expressivism, such as David Hume and A.J. Ayer1, have held the denial thesis, 
as well as (in certain writings) recent expressivist writers such as Allan Gibbard (1990). 
The apparent trouble with squaring expressivism with minimalism is that there is 
only a trivial difference, on such theories, between the assertion that p and the assertion that 
it is true that p. In discussions of moral matters, it is quite clear that utterances that have the 
appearance of genuine assertions are made, and such apparent assertions would seem to 
express true or false propositions regarding moral issues.  A person may sincerely assert 
“Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust,” and such an ostensible assertion 
would seem to express the belief that great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are 
unjust.   
However, given that the object of this apparent belief is the proposition that great 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust, the minimalist would have to accept that 
                                                
1 I am not here claiming that Hume or Ayer is an expressivist in the contemporary sense. 
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such a proposition is capable of being straightforwardly true or false, pace the traditional 
expressivist view.  It may still be possible for a minimalist to deny that there are in fact 
propositions expressed by these apparent assertions of moral claims.  The most coherent 
position for a minimalist to hold is one according to which there are moral propositions, and 
thus moral utterances are capable of being true or false: In order to deny this, a minimalist 
would have to claim that these utterances do not have a propositional content, a meaning, 
and such statements do not seem to be meaningless.   
According to the view that moral utterances have propositional contents, the 
following would be a legitimate instance of the minimalist schema: 
I:  <Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust> is true iff great 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust.   
Thus, according to a minimalist account of truth, given the further assumption that moral 
utterances genuinely express propositions, such utterances must be either true or false.  Such 
an admission is tantamount to the rejection of traditional expressivism. 
There are a number of reasons to think that rejecting this aspect of traditional 
expressivism would be a good thing.  The claim that normative and moral utterances are 
incapable of being true or false does not fit well with ordinary practice.  Speakers commonly 
attribute truth or falsehood to moral utterances.  People generally consider utterances of 
‘Rape is wrong’ true, and consider utterances of ‘It is permissible to attack strangers for fun’ 
false.  Any philosophical qualms regarding the attribution of truth (or falsehood) to moral 
utterances do not seem to affect this practice of attributing truth values to moral utterances.    
There are number of related factors that tell in favor of the attribution of truth to 
moral utterances. Normative and moral assertions also have all of the same surface features 
as nonnormative and nonmoral assertions. Attributions of truth to moral utterances would 
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be required to account for the role such utterances play in valid arguments. In order to have 
the possibility of a notion of moral knowledge that accords well with our ordinary practice, 
we would need to attribute truth to moral utterances.   
While minimalism would allow the expressivist to attribute truth to moral utterances, 
the aforementioned incompatibilist philosophers have held that expressivists who accept 
minimalism do so at the cost of their own theory. In “The Status of Content,” Boghossian 
presents a version of this incompatibilist argument directed toward the work of A.J. Ayer. 
Boghossian summarizes Ayer’s account of the redundancy theory of truth and his emotivist 
account of ethics, and claims that Ayer failed to recognize  
the tension between such a [redundancy theory] conception [of truth] and a non-
factualist thesis about a given range of assertoric discourse (Boghossian 1990, 163). 
The particular “non-factualist thesis” Boghossian has in mind here is Ayer’s emotivist 
account of moral discourse.   
Boghossian notes correctly that moral utterances fit many of the criteria for 
straightforward assertoric discourse of the sort to which one would attribute truth.  Moral 
utterances are meaningful, declarative, and are embedded in sentences formed by truth 
functional connectives (conjunction, disjunction, negation, conditionals) and within 
propositional attitude contexts.  There is at least a prima facie reason to regard such utterances 
as being on a par with nonmoral utterances. 
Given that we have such good reason to attribute truth to moral utterances, 
Boghossian contends that Ayer’s redundancy theory and expressivism are in conflict.  In 
order to resolve the conflict, one needs a more “robust” theory of truth that will allow one 
to distinguish moral discourse, which is neither straightforwardly true nor false, from other 
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realms of discourse that can be straightforwardly true or false (such as, for example, physics).  
Boghossian writes: 
A non-factualism about any subject matter requires a conception of truth stronger 
than the deflationary: it is committed to holding that “true” stands for some real, 
language-independent property, eligibility for which will not be certified solely by the 
fact that a sentence is declarative or significant (Boghossian 1990, 165).  
It is important to note here that this argument is framed in response to Ayer’s views. 
Boghossian (1990) objects to deflationary theories of truth on the grounds that a 
“nonfactualist” account of truth cannot distinguish between factualist and nonfactualist 
accounts of different discourses. One aspect of this argument is that certain deflationists 
cannot explain the use of the notion of truth to generalize over claims in a given discourse. 
This objection is not successful against minimalism regarding truth. Unlike earlier 
deflationary theories such as the redundancy theory of truth, minimalism allows that ‘true’ is 
a genuine predicate and truth itself is a property. As a result minimalism is not susceptible to 
this aspect of Boghossian’s argument. The question still remains whether, on a minimalist 
account, one can mark a distinction between factual and nonfactual discourse.  
The argument presented by Wright differs from that of Boghossian insofar as it is 
clearly directed at contemporary deflationists.  Wright argues that any expressivist or 
projectivist account that allows for the attribution of truth to moral utterances will collapse 
into moral realism.  In his review of Spreading the Word, Wright makes this charge against 
Blackburn’s quasi-realism.  While not explicitly mentioning deflationism or minimalism, 
Wright notes that Blackburn’s account seems to pave the way for the attribution of truth to 
moral statements, a result that deflationists and minimalists ought to accept.  Thus Wright is 
dubious of the compatibility of the attribution of truth to moral claims and expressivism: 
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If it really can be explained—and Blackburn takes imaginative strides toward doing 
so—how the moral projectivist can acknowledge the susceptibility of moral 
judgements to conditional and other forms of embedding, and even how we can 
have a worthwhile truth predicate for them, then, so far from vindicating a form of 
moral anti-realism, why has it not been explained how the moral realist can, in effect, 
cut past the epistemological difficulties which beset non-naturalism without incurring 
any obligations to furnish reductions? (Wright 1985, 318)   
I will call this argument of Wright’s the ‘collapse argument.’   
A more recent version of the collapse argument is clearly directed at minimalism 
regarding truth2. Wright contends that minimalism undermines both expressivism and the 
error theory of J.L. Mackie (1977): 
With each of these minimalisms in place, almost all of the areas which have 
traditionally provoked realist/anti-realist debate—ethics, aesthetics, intentional 
psychology, mathematics, theoretical science, and so on—will turn out to traffic in 
truth-evaluable contents, which moreover, when the disciplinary standards proper to 
the discourse are satisfied, we are going to be entitled to claim to be true.  So two 
traditional anti-realist paradigms are immediately under pressure: expressivism—the 
                                                
2 It is worth noting that Wright uses the term ‘minimalism’ to refer to a different theory from 
the minimalist theory of truth I have discussed throughout this paper.  The characteristics of 
Wright’s ‘minimalism’ and the minimalist theory of truth that lead to the problem discussed 
here are identical, though, and hence it is reasonable to take Wright to be criticizing not only 
‘minimalism’ (in his sense) but all deflationist and minimalist accounts of truth.  Also, Wright 
claims that ‘minimalism’ (in his sense) is what all deflationary theories essentially amount to, 
or ought to be: “…minimalism about truth, as described in this and the succeeding 
chapter…is just what the deflationist trend comes to (what would-be deflationists like 
Horwich ought to advocate)” (Wright 1992, 12).  For this reason, it will not be necessary for 
the purposes of this paper to go into great detail regarding Wright’s ‘minimalism’ and the 




denial that a target discourse, despite an apparently assertoric surface, really deals in 
truth-evaluable contents—is not going to be an option; and the error-theorist, like John 
Mackie on ethics…will have his work cut out to make the charge of global error 
stick… (Wright 1996, 864) 
The collapse argument can be paraphrased without using the somewhat vexed jargon 
Wright uses.  One of the main points Wright is making regarding expressivism is as follows: 
1. In order for expressivism to be a distinct philosophical position, there must be a 
significant difference between expressivism and moral realist positions. 
2. The only significant difference there could be between expressivism and moral 
realism is the different approaches taken by the expressivist and the moral realist 
to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. 
3. On the assumption that a deflationist or minimalist account is correct, then the 
expressivist ought to attribute truth to moral utterances in the same fashion as 
the moral realist. 
4. Thus, on the assumption that a deflationist or minimalist account is correct, 
expressivism is not a distinct philosophical position. 
The problematic premise in this argument is premise 2.  There is at least one significant 
difference between the expressivist and the moral realist, namely, a difference in their view 
of moral ontology. Distinguishing the expressivist and the realist on these grounds has not been 
the standard approach in the metaethics literature. 
 
 
The Collapse Argument and the Semantic Strategy 
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 One possible response to Wright’s collapse argument is to suggest that the distinctive 
account offered of moral semantics by expressivists such as Blackburn (1998) and Gibbard 
(2003) is the element of expressivism that distinguishes expressivists from realists. It is this 
semantics that, contrary to premise 2 of the collapse argument, provides for a distinction 
between expressivist and realist views. James Lenman (2003) contends that the distinctive 
element of expressivism is its semantic view. Certain sentences in a language, according to 
Lenman, are truth-apt without further explanation. An example of such a sentence, 
according to Lenman, is “Everest is higher than Snowdon.” What is distinctive about an 
expressivist account of discourse is that such an account explains the truth-aptitude of the 
relevant sentences in terms of the semantics of non-truth-apt sentences. To use Lenman’s 
examples, the truth-apt sentence L1 has a meaning that, on an expressivist account, is spelled 
out based on the meaning of non-truth-apt sentence L2: 
 L1: It is wrong to kill innocent people. 
 L2: Hurrah for our not killing innocent people! (Lenman 2003, 57). 
This marks out a distinction between sentences with simple truth-aptness such as “Everest is 
higher than Snowdon” and sentences with explained truth-aptness such as L1. 
Does this contrast between sentences that are simply truth apt and those sentences 
that have an explained truth-aptness mark a difference between expressivists and realists? Is 
this sufficient to answer Wright’s collapse argument? It is hard to see how this would be so. 
Lenman’s semantic strategy may serve well as an account of a key element of expressivist 
accounts of discourse, but this strategy does not provide for a distinction between 
expressivists and realists. This is so, because it would be perfectly possible for a full-blown 
Moorean realist to agree with the expressivist on the explanation of the semantics of 
sentence L1, while still holding that moral realism is nonetheless correct. One could both be a 
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nonnaturalist realist like G.E. Moore, believing that there exist non-natural moral facts, while 
also accepting a semantics of the sort suggested by Lenman. A focus on semantics is beside 
the point of what distinguishes expressivists from realists, given that the latter is not 
primarily a semantic doctrine but a metaphysical one. For this reason, the semantic strategy 
alone is insufficient to answer the concern raised by Wright.  
The Collapse Argument and Moral Ontology 
As noted above, the significant difference between the moral realist and expressivists 
is the distinctive account offered by expressivists of moral ontology. Expressivists have 
motivated their view by noting the distinctions between the metaphysical commitments of 
expressivism and realism. Blackburn, in his “How to be an Ethical Antirealist,” characterizes 
his “projectivist” view as an “antirealist” one due to the fact that such a theory involves 
explanations of moral matters that need not make appeal to moral facts and properties: 
This theory is visibly antirealist, for the explanations offered make no irreducible or 
essential appeal to the existence of moral “properties” or “facts”; they demand no 
“ontology of morals” (Blackburn 1988, 174). 
Gibbard distinguishes, in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, between naturalistic facts, normative facts, 
and facts of meaning.  Gibbard then claims that there are no real normative facts: “In my 
own picture…[apparent] normative facts, will come out, strictly, as no real facts at all…” 
(Gibbard 1990, 23).  In his recent book Thinking How to Live, Gibbard characterizes 
expressivism as denying that there are any distinctive normative states of affairs:  
There is no such thing as a specifically normative state of affairs; all states of affairs 
are natural…Then, clearly if my quasi-realism is correct, there aren’t distinctively 
normative facts, only naturalistic facts (Gibbard 2003, 181). 
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How are we to understand this key metaphysical component of expressivism, the 
idea that there are no “irreducible,” “essential,” or “specifically normative” properties or 
facts? One might suspect at this point that the minimalist is in a poor position to do so—as 
James Dreier has suggested recently, there is an apparent problem of “creeping” minimalism 
(Dreier 2004). Minimalists who have been inclined to accept the minimalist truth schema 
have also been inclined, on similar grounds, to accept a minimalist property schema, a 
schema that claims that properties are the “shadow” of predicates. In his discussion of 
Gibbard’s Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Horwich has suggested the following property schema: 
For any object x, x has the property of being F if and only if x is F. (1993, p. 74) 
If this is the proper minimalist approach to properties, then any theorist who accepts the 
appropriateness of assertions involving moral predicates will also accept the existence of 
moral properties: there is only a trivial step from ‘Inequality in wealth is wrong’ to ‘Inequality 
in wealth has the property of being wrong.’  
Horwich offers similar minimalist schema for the proper understanding of facts, in 
general. According to following minimalist fact schema, 
 That p is a fact if and only if p (Horwich, 1993, p. 74). 
This fact schema, like the property schema, seems to deflate entirely the ontological dispute 
over moral realism and moral antirealism. Any philosopher who would accept the truth of a 
first-order moral claim such as ‘Inequality in wealth is wrong’ would be committed as well, 
by the fact schema, to ‘It is a fact that inequality in wealth is wrong.’ Thus it seems that the 
minimalist is committed to the existence of moral facts and properties, and there is no 
significance to the dispute between moral realists and expressivists. This is the “problem of 
creeping minimalism.” If this indeed happens to be a problem without a solution, it would 
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seem to vindicate Wright’s claim that expressivists, without the denial thesis, cannot mark a 
distinction between expressivism and realism. 
 Dreier does not claim that the problem of creeping minimalism cannot be solved—
He has suggested that there is, even taking a minimalist approach to properties and facts, 
nonetheless a key metaphysical distinction between expressivists and realists. Dreier’s 
suggestion is that the key to understanding the differences between expressivists and realists 
(specifically, nonnaturalists such as G.E. Moore) lies in their approach to explanation, and 
specifically to the explanation of moral judgments: 
Suppose that Julia sincerely asserts the sentence, ‘Knowledge is intrinsically 
good.’ She believes, then, that knowledge is intrinsically good. 
  (J) Julia believes that knowledge is intrinsically good… 
 What the “explanation” explanation tells us is that the division between 
[Gibbard and a non-naturalist realist such as G.E. Moore] must lie in their differing 
explanations of (J). According to a Moorean, (J) must consist in Julia’s standing in a 
certain doxastic relation to goodness…By contrast, Gibbard’s expressivist account 
will explain (J) by reference to the sort of planning state Julia is in: perhaps she has 
decided to include knowledge among her non-instrumental aims (Dreier 2004, 41). 
Thus, according to Dreier, it is in the explanation of moral judgments that the distinction 
between expressivists and realists can be found. 
 As Matthew Chrisman (forthcoming) has argued, Dreier’s suggestion seems ill-suited 
as a general criterion for distinguishing realists from antirealists. Chrisman, in his argument, 
raises the parallel question of how the cosmological realist, and the cosmological antirealist, 
ought to approach the explanation of the following judgment: 
 (K) Joey believes that the planet Krypton is made of kryptonite. 
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It is unlikely that either the cosmological realist or the cosmological antirealist would want to 
make an appeal, here, to the nature of the planet Krypton in explaining the genesis of this 
belief. Thus, in the explanation of this sort of judgment, there is no distinction between the 
cosmological realist and the cosmological antirealist. In light of this, it seems hard to see how 
Dreier’s account can be generalized. 
 A similar problem to the one cited by Chrisman arises in the case of explaining moral 
judgments. Consider Dreier’s original example, of Julia who believes that knowledge is 
intrinsically good. Perhaps she reached this conclusion because she heard it in a lecture given 
by an especially charismatic professor. It is not a conclusion she reached on her own, and if 
there be such a thing as intuition of the good, she has never taken the time to engage in it 
herself. It seems that, on a realist or an expressivist view, the proper explanation of her 
judgment would tell us more about the charismatic professor, and her effect on people, and 
very little about the ontological status of goodness. It does not, thus, seem that the 
explanation of judgment provides us with a clear criterion for marking the distinction 
between expressivists and realists. 
 I think that there is an, however, important grain of truth in Dreier’s suggestion, one 
that is helpful to understand the distinctive metaphysical commitments of expressivists. This 
is in the suggestion that explanation is key for understanding the distinctive views of 
expressivists. I contend that, rather than focusing on the explanation of judgments, the key 
metaphysical element of expressivism is a view of the explanatory status of properties. While 
minimalism suggests that expressivists should accept the existence of moral properties (and 
facts), explanatory considerations mark the distinction between expressivists and realists. 
These considerations show how expressivism contrasts with the views of naturalistic and 
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nonnaturalistic forms of moral realism. Explanation helps to cash out the expressivist denial 
of the existence of “irreducible,” “essential,” or “specifically normative” properties. 
 The expressivist view of the explanatory status of properties is best understood in 
terms of a basic fact about explanation—explanation is asymmetric. There is a distinction 
between an explanans and an explanandum: the explanans explains the explanandum, but 
not vice versa. We can use this basic fact about explanation to mark a distinction between 
kinds of properties: “explanans” properties, properties that provide explanations for other 
kinds of properties, “explanandum” properties. These are relative notions: a property serves 
as an explanans with respect to a given explanandum property. Understanding the views of 
expressivists requires seeing how the expressivist would situate moral properties in a kind of 
hierarchy of properties, defined in terms of explanans and explanandum properties. The 
explanandum properties could be thought of as being at a higher level on an explanatory 
hierarchy than the explanans properties.3 
 One aspect of the expressivist view of moral properties is the aspect noted by Dreier: 
moral properties do not serve, on the expressivist view, as explanans properties for moral 
judgments. Another aspect of the expressivist view, one that marks a distinction between 
expressivists and naturalistic realists like Nicolas Sturgeon (1985), is that expressivists do not 
                                                
3 It is possible for two different properties to serve as explanans properties for each other. If 
this is the case, it might be helpful to think of such properties as being on the same level on 
an explanatory hierarchy, but nonetheless bearing explanatory relations to each other. I will 
call this phenomenon ‘lateral explanation.’ To cite a simple example, pain might provide an 
explanation for depression, while depression may also provide an explanation for feelings of 
pain. If this is the case, than pain and depression are each explanans properties with respect 
to the other, and on the same level of an explanatory hierarchy. That such lateral 
explanations exist does not undermine the use of an explanatory hierarchy to mark 
distinctions between views. For if a reductionist identity theory is correct, it would be correct 
to think of neural properties as being the explanans for each pain and depression. So, even if 
pain and depression are on the same level of the explanatory hierarchy, each could also be 
thought of as being at one level higher than neural properties.  
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make appeal to moral properties as explanans properties in accounts of action: The 
naturalistic approach favored by Sturgeon, explaining Hitler’s actions based on the causal-
explanatory role of Hitler’s depravity, would be rejected on the expressivist view, for it 
makes an unnecessary “essential” appeal to moral properties. The best explanation of 
Hitler’s actions would be based not on the depravity of Hitler, but rather on facts regarding 
Hitler’s psychology and attitudes. Related to this matter, and to the debate between Sturgeon 
and Gilbert Harman, the expressivist would also deny the moral properties could serve as 
explanans properties in accounts of observation. To cite Harman’s famous example, the 
expressivist explanation of why a suitable observer would observe that setting a cat on fire is 
wrong would not be one that makes an appeal to the wrongness of the act. To sum these 
points up, the denial of there being any “essential,” or “specifically normative” properties is 
best understood, in part, as denying a role as explanans properties to moral properties.  
 This denial of a basic explanatory role to moral properties might still not be thought 
mark out a clear distinction between expressivists and realists, for while naturalistic realists 
are committed to the idea that moral properties are explanans properties, properties that play 
an explanatory role in accounting for judgment or action, “non-naturalistic” realists such as 
G.E. Moore and Russ Shafer-Landau make no such claims about the explanatory status of 
moral properties. The non-naturalistic view is fully consistent with moral properties not 
being explanans properties, in the sense explained above. This might cause further doubts as 
to whether the expressivist offers a distinctive metaphysical position. 
 There are two key differences, also best understood in explanation, between non-
naturalistic views and expressivism. First, on an intuitionist view such as Moore’s, moral 
properties are explanans properties, given that the existence of moral properties is an 
essential element in the explanation of moral intuitions. On intuitionist views, moral 
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properties are explanans properties for intuition properties. Expressivists, who are skeptical 
of moral intuition, will deny this intuitionist claim: there are no moral intuitions, hence no 
need to make appeal to moral properties in the explanation of intuitions. A second key 
aspect of non-naturalism is that moral properties are “sui generis”: they cannot be accounted 
for in terms of naturalistic properties. Shafer-Landau, in his account, contends that moral 
properties supervene upon natural properties, but there is no explanation whatsoever of how 
this is the case—he suggests that the relation between the moral and the natural on his view 
is similar to the relation between the mental and the physical on Malebranche’s occasionalist 
theory. “The present view…requires something on the order of divine intervention to 
explain the intimate connection between something’s moral status and its natural features” 
(Shafer-Landau 2003, 78). This view is not one that is shared by the expressivist—as Simon 
Blackburn has argued (Blackburn 1971, 1984, 1986), a key advantage of expressivism is in its 
demystification of the supervenience of the moral upon the physical world. This explanation 
of the moral in terms of the natural world rests on appeal to moral attitudes—on the 
expressivist view, moral properties are explained in terms of moral attitudes, and hence are 
not sui generis. This is not to say that moral properties are identical to attitude properties: 
the latter can serve as an explanation for the former without the two kinds of property being 
identical. Blackburn’s idea that moral properties are “projected” on to the world, and 
Gibbard’s more recent theory that morality is accounted for in terms of states of planning, 
are instances of this sort of approach. We can summarize this aspect of expressivism by 
saying that expressivism allows for moral properties to be “explanandum” properties. 
 Thus there is a metaphysical view distinctive of expressivism. Unlike the naturalistic 
realist, the expressivist denies that moral properties serve as explanans properties for 
judgments, acts, or observations. Unlike the intuitionist, expressivists do not claim that 
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moral properties serve as explanans properties for moral intuitions. Last, but not least, the 
expressivist does not hold the non-naturalist view that there moral properties are not, in 
some way, explanandum properties—there is an explanation of moral properties in terms of 
moral attitudes. I will summarize this metaphysical aspect of expressivism, throughout the 
rest of the paper, by saying that expressivists are not committed to robust moral properties, 
where a robust property is either (a) an explanans property in the relevant sense or (b) sui 
generis. The expressivist view denies both of these claims, holding the view that moral 
properties are nonrobust. 
Expressivism and the Error Theory 
 While there is, in light of these considerations, an expressivist position distinct from 
realism regarding the metaphysics of moral properties, there remains a question of whether 
expressivists are able to distinguish their view of these matters from other anti-realist 
positions, such as the error theory of J.L. Mackie (1977). As noted above, Wright considers 
the minimalist approach to truth a source of concern not only for expressivists, but also for 
error theorists as well. Wright charges “the error-theorist, like John Mackie on ethics…will 
have his work cut out to make the charge of global error stick…” (Wright 1996, 864). This 
raises two issues. The first, beyond the scope of the present paper, is whether or not the case 
for the error theory is correct. The second issue raised by Wright’s concern is the issue of 
how expressivism might differ from the error theory. One might worry that the minimalist 
approach to properties discussed above fails to distinguish among these anti-realist views.  
 This worry is unfounded. The minimalist property schema provides sufficient 
materials to distinguish the expressivist from the error theorist. One of the key commitments 
of the error theorist, unlike the expressivist, is the view that all moral claims are in fact false. 
Moral claims purport, according to Mackie, to refer to a realm of objective moral properties. 
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These moral properties, Mackie argues, do not exist. As Mackie writes, the error theory is the 
view that “although most people in moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things 
to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false” (Mackie 1977, 
35). 
 This is a more radical position regarding moral ontology than the ontological 
position of the expressivist. If the arguments presented above are correct, expressivists 
ought to claim that moral properties do in fact exist, but that such properties are not robust 
explanatory properties. The error theorist would part company with the expressivist by 
denying the existence of moral properties of any sort, explanatory or nonexplanatory. It is 
worth noting that the minimalist property schema does not commit the error theorist to the 
existence of moral properties. The schema is as follows: 
For any object x, x has the property of being F if and only if x is F. (1993, p. 74) 
Given that, for any moral predicate ‘F’, claims of the form ‘x is F’ are all false on the error 
theoretical view, there need be no commitment to moral properties on the error theoretical 
view. In other words, by denying all claims of the form ‘x is F’ where ‘F’ is a moral predicate, 
the error theorist can also deny that any object whatsoever has a moral property. This kind 
of antirealism is also consistent with the minimalist property schema. Hence we can use 
minimalism about properties to distinguish between error theorists and expressivists. 
To sum up the points made so far, what distinguishes expressivists both from moral 
realists and from error theorists is the distinctive account offered by expressivists of the 
metaphysics of moral properties. Given the relevance of these ontological claims, and of the 
expressivist commitment to a distinct view of the metaphysics of moral properties, it would 
not be correct to hold, as Wright does, that the only significant matter of dispute between 
the expressivist and the moral realist is over the attribution of truth to moral statements.  
 
18 
Perhaps, however, implicit in Wright’s argument is the claim also made by Boghossian, that 
expressivism’s commitment to a certain view of truth renders it incompatible with 
minimalism.  In the quote from Wright 1996, it is worth noting that Wright presents as the 
entire definition of expressivism the claim that moral discourse does not “really deal in truth-
evaluable contents.” 
The position presented by Boghossian and Wright, according to which minimalism 
and expressivism are incompatible, is based on a particular account of expressivism.  This 
account reflects the commitments of those philosophers who first articulated proto-
expressivist views, such as Hume and Ayer.  It is not often noted that these philosophers 
had accounts of truth and meaning that led them to conclude that the expressivist should 
refrain from claiming that moral utterances are straightforwardly true or false.  It is also odd, 
given the amount that has been written over the course of the 20th century and into the 21st 
century on expressivism and its forbears, that Boghossian and Wright, in the arguments they 
present, implicitly take the commitments of Hume and Ayer as representative of the entire 
expressivist tradition. As I will discuss in the following two sections, Hume drew this 
conclusion based on the conjunction of his views on morality and a correspondence theory 
of truth, and Ayer drew this conclusion based on the conjunction of his views on morality, a 
redundancy theory of truth, and a verificationist semantics.  The minimalist who rejects the 
correspondence theory of truth and the verificationist theory of meaning need not draw the 
same conclusions as Hume and Ayer.  
Hume, Correspondence Truth, and the Denial Thesis 
The metaethical theory on which I have focused in this paper, expressivism, is 
indebted to the account of morality in David Hume’s philosophy, especially the great work 
A Treatise of Human Nature.  In the Treatise, Hume argues for the view that moral attitudes are 
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neither true nor false. Thus Hume, one of the ancestors of contemporary expressivism, was 
committed to the Denial Thesis.  However, unlike more recent philosophers, Hume makes it 
clear that this position on morality is a consequence of two distinct theories: a metaphysical 
position on the nature of moral sentiments, and a theory of truth, a version of the 
correspondence theory. 
In the Treatise, Hume accounts for moral attitudes in terms of the passions, or 
emotions.  Only a passion can move a person to act, according to Hume, and so any moral 
decision-making have as its basis certain passions.  The passions, according to Hume, are 
dependent not upon the world, but on the mind of the individual making the moral decision. 
As Hume writes in the Treatise,  
Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real 
relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not 
susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and 
can never be an object of our reason. Now !tis evident our passions, volitions, and 
actions are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original 
facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other 
passions, volitions, and actions. !Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc’d 
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason (Hume 2000, 
295) 
If truth or falsehood consists of agreement between representations in the mind and mind-
independent objects, as it does on Hume’s formulation of the correspondence theory, then it 
follows that Hume must deny that moral attitudes that consist in passions are capable of 
being true or false. 
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Hume’s argument for the claim that moral attitudes cannot either be true or false 
may be summarized as follows: 
P1: (Semantic premise) Truth or falsehood consists in agreement or disagreement of 
ideas with entities resembling the ideas. 
As Hume states the theory, “contradiction” of truth “consists in the disagreement of 
ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they represent” (Hume 2000, 267).  
Such contradiction is evident in cases when one believes, for example, in a dream that one is 
sitting at a desk, but no desk corresponds to the idea one has, the mental representation of a 
desk.   
P2: (Metaphysical premise) There are no mind-independent moral objects, but rather 
only passions and volitions in the mind. 
Hume expresses this point as follows: 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence; and 
contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other 
existence or modification.  When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, 
and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am 
thirsty, sick, or more than five foot high.  (Hume, 2000, 266). 
From P1 and P2 it follows that: 
C: Moral attitudes are neither true nor false. 
Hume implicitly draws the conclusion as follows in a general statement regarding the 
passions: “’Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be contradictory 
to truth and reason” (ibid., 266-67).  
With the original argument for the Denial Thesis in hand, it ought to be clear that 
Hume’s argument is not sound if we reject a correspondence theory of truth.  If we reject 
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premise P1, the correspondence theory, in favor of a minimalist account of truth, it is clear 
that the conclusion C, the Denial Thesis, does not follow from Hume’s argument.  The 
Denial Thesis follows from this Humean argument only on the assumption that Hume’s 
fairly simplistic correspondence theory of truth is correct.      
Ayer, Verificationism, and the Denial Thesis 
 As I have discussed in detail above, in the section Are Minimalism and 
Expressivism Compatible?, one of the influential arguments for incompatibilism is 
presented in response to the views of Ayer.  Paul Boghossian contends that Ayer failed to 
recognize the “tension” between the redundancy theory of truth and an expressivist account 
of ethics (Boghossian 1990, 163).  Given that this debate has been framed in response to 
Ayer’s views, it is not solely of historical importance to investigate whether there was in fact 
a tension in the views Ayer presented in Language, Truth, and Logic.  In fact, when Gibbard 
describes his view in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings as a “non-cognitivistic” one, given that 
“according to it, to call a thing rational is not to state a matter of fact, truly or falsely,” he 
cites in a footnote his debt to Ayer’s “non-cognitivistic treatment of moral language…” 
(Gibbard 1990, 8). 
A closer inspection of Ayer’s account reveals that Boghossian is incorrect regarding 
the supposed tension in Ayer: The views presented in Language, Truth, and Logic are fully 
consistent, and Ayer’s case for the Denial Thesis rests on a view that minimalists need not 
accept, a verificationist account of meaning.  Ayer formulates his version of the redundancy 
theory of truth in terms of propositions.  Propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity. 
Ayer writes:  
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…to say that a belief, or a statement, or a judgement, is true is always an elliptical 
way of ascribing truth to a proposition, which is believed, stated, or judged (Ayer 
1936, 88). 
That this is an important aspect of Ayer’s view will become clear when we consider his view 
on whether moral utterances involve propositional content. 
On Ayer’s account, the addition of the words ‘is true’ to an assertion does not 
change the content of the original assertion.  These words are redundant.  “When one says 
that the proposition ‘Queen Anne is dead’ is true, all that one is saying is that Queen Anne is 
dead” (ibid., 88).  There are many disadvantages to such a redundancy theory that are not 
shared by other deflationary accounts such as minimalism: it is quite hard to imagine how to 
formulate useful generalizations about true statements on such a view. 
What has not been noted sufficiently in the discussion of Ayer is that in his 
discussion of moral language, Ayer makes a quite strong, rather implausible claim regarding 
moral judgments.  Ayer notes a difficulty with accounts of morality which make appeal to 
rational intuition as the basis for moral knowledge.  If we take such an intuitionist view 
seriously, how do we determine which purported moral intuitions are the correct ones?  If 
one person claims to know by intuition that sacrificing the life of one person to save the 
lives of five others is right, and another person claims to know by intuition that sacrificing 
the life of one person to save the lives of five is wrong, how do we decide which intuition is 
the correct one?  It seems we have no way of verifying the appeals to intuition involved in 
ethical judgment. 
In the discussion of Ayer by Boghossian and the citation of Ayer by Gibbard, it is 
not noted that, in addition to a redundancy theory of truth, Ayer held a verificationist 
account of meaning.  On Ayer’s account, an expression is meaningful only if it can be 
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verified.  Any expression that is not verifiable does not express a proposition, but rather a 
mere “pseudoproposition” that is not capable of being true or false.  It is due to Ayer’s view 
that moral judgments are unverifiable—hence they express “pseudopropositions”—that 
Ayer held that moral utterances are incapable of being true or false.  Boghossian overlooks 
this verificationist constraint—With such a constraint in place, it is clear that Ayer’s views on 
morality and truth are consistent. 
As was the case with Hume’s argument for the denial thesis, it is very important to 
note that the argument in Ayer from expressivism to denying that moral utterances are 
capable of being true or false rests on assumptions the contemporary deflationist need not 
share.  A minimalist about truth who holds a use-theoretical account of meaning would 
reject a crucial step in Ayer’s argument.  Not being a verificationist, the use-theorist can 
reject Ayer’s claim that moral utterances express only pseudopropositions.  Thus neither of 
the historical arguments from expressivism to the Denial Thesis ought to move a 
philosopher convinced of expressivism and deflationism to hold that moral utterances are 
incapable of being true or false. 
Minimalism, Expressivism, and the Attribution of Truth 
The view that moral utterances are not straightforwardly true is a theory that is not 
required for a formulation of an expressivist theory.  As I have shown in the sections above, 
Hume and Ayer drew the conclusion that moral utterances are neither true nor false from 
their commitment to, for Hume, a correspondence theory of truth, and for Ayer, a 
verificationist theory of meaning.  A philosopher who holds neither of these theories will 
naturally draw different conclusions regarding the truth and falsehood of certain utterances. 
Regardless of the failure of the traditional expressivist arguments to motivate 
minimalists to accept the Denial Thesis, one can still ask whether this thesis is nonetheless 
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an essential element of the expressivist theory.  In order to see whether this is the case we 
must look to the arguments that have motivated expressivism as well as the details of the 
theory.  If neither the motivations behind expressivism nor the details of the theory is in 
conflict with minimalism, then it is clear that the case for incompatibilism is a failure. 
The crucial motivations behind expressivist views, historically, are as follows.  First, 
expressivists are motivated by a view on the metaphysics of morality.  Expressivists have 
denied, as I have explained above, the existence of robust moral properties. The other 
crucial motivation behind expressivism is that expressivists want an account of moral 
language that can explain the close tie between moral attitudes and motivation.  This aspect 
of expressivism has a historical lineage beginning with the work of Hume cited above, 
particularly Hume’s claim that the passions alone can motivate, and reason, without a 
passion, cannot.  Due to this account of motivation, expressivists have claimed that moral 
utterances serve the purpose of expressing some mental state that plays a role in leading to 
motivation, such as an emotional reaction, a desire, acceptance of a norm, or what Gibbard 
(2003) calls planning. 
The minimalist account of truth shows the possibility of a coherent position that is 
consistent with these motivations behind expressivism while allowing for the possibility that 
moral utterances are capable of being true or false.  It is possible for the expressivist to hold 
the view that there are no robust moral properties as well as the view that moral utterances 
serve to express desires (or similar mental states) independently of any commitments on a 
particular account of truth.   
There is no inconsistency between holding that moral utterances are 
straightforwardly true and holding that there are no robust properties picked out by moral 
predicates such as ‘right,’ ‘just,’ ‘good,’ and ‘evil.’  It should be clear that one’s stance 
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regarding the existence robust moral properties and facts is not automatically settled by 
answering the question of whether truth ought to be attributed to moral utterances.  On the 
minimalist theory, truth could be attributed to an utterance such as ‘Killing is wrong’ 
regardless of whether wrongness is a robust property.  All that is required is that wrongness 
is a property according to the minimalistic property schema. What does determine whether 
or not truth should be attributed to utterances of ‘Killing is wrong’ is whether killing is 
wrong.  If wrongness is predicated of killing, it is not necessarily the case that a robust 
property is being attributed to killing.  It is a separate matter whether we can make an 
explanatory appeal to the wrongness of killing to explain whether the wrongness of such acts 
is what causes people not to commit them, or whether it is the wrongness of killing that 
explains our knowing that killing is wrong.  One could hold that killing is wrong yet deny any 
such explanatory claims.  So, if wrongness is attributed to killing, then (by the deflationary 
schema), there is a true attribution of wrongness to killing.  This does not, for reasons 
discussed above, imply that wrongness need be a robust property.   
The issue of whether moral attitudes consist of beliefs only, desires only, or some 
combination of the two is independent both of this metaphysical issue and the matter of 
whether truth ought to be attributed to moral utterances. The major question regarding 
moral psychology is the question of what sort of mental events are involved in moral 
thinking.  Can one, as Hume (2000) famously claimed, never be motivated by a belief alone, 
without any passion?  If so, do all moral attitudes essentially involve emotions or desires?  
On the other hand, given the resemblance between certain kinds of moral talk and other 
language that serves to express beliefs, should we hold that moral claims generally express 




 Is this issue of moral psychology, the issue of the nature of moral attitudes, an issue 
that is inseparable from the issue of moral metaphysics?  Is it possible to combine distinct 
views on moral psychology with various views on metaphysics? Can we only have moral 
beliefs if moral utterances are straightforwardly true and there are robust moral properties?  
Would claiming that there are merely moral desires but no moral beliefs preclude the 
attribution of straightforward truth to moral utterances, and lead us to deny the existence of 
robust moral properties? 
 There are three possible views one could hold regarding moral attitudes: (1) Moral 
attitudes consist in desires alone; (2) Moral attitudes consist in beliefs and desires; (3) Moral 
attitudes consist in beliefs.  I will consider views 2 and 3 first.  On either of these views, it is 
clear that holding such a view of moral psychology does not automatically settle the issues of 
moral truth or moral metaphysics.  It is possible to have beliefs about both robust properties 
and nonrobust properties.  Consider other properties that may or may not play a basic 
explanatory role, such as color.  It is a subject of debate in philosophy whether colors are 
objective properties, properties that can be invoked in explanations of color perceptions, or 
whether color properties are subjective properties, projections from perceivers onto the 
world.  In either case, it is clear that we can have beliefs about colors: We can believe a 
certain object is blue.  Such a belief is true or false depending on the circumstances.  
Therefore, one can combine the view that there are color beliefs with the view that colors 
are nonrobust properties as well as the view the colors are robust properties. 
 What if view 1, the theory that moral attitudes consist in having desires, is correct?  
Many philosophers who have been inclined toward such a view have had difficulty 
explaining the apparent belief-like nature of moral attitudes.  It seems intuitive to describe a 
person who is against the genocide in Darfur as a person who believes the genocide in 
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Darfur is wrong.  For this reason, philosophers such as Simon Blackburn have 
acknowledged that moral attitudes, while essentially desires, often have belief-like 
characteristics. Such states are “quasi-beliefs” or “pseudo-beliefs”: While they are not 
genuine beliefs, they are sufficiently belief-like to play a similar role. 
 If one is sufficiently motivated by the Humean considerations cited above to hold 
view 1, and deny the possibility of any moral beliefs, then one can appeal to such a notion of 
“quasi-belief” to articulate a range of positions on moral truth and moral metaphysics.  
Perhaps, as A.J. Ayer claims, moral attitudes are not sufficiently belief-like to have 
propositional contents; hence there are no moral truths.  Perhaps, as Blackburn claims, 
moral attitudes are similar enough to beliefs that we can consider such attitudes capable of 
being assessed as true or false. 
 In a similar vein, if a philosopher who denies the existence of genuine moral beliefs 
holds that moral commitments are nonetheless “quasi-beliefs,” such a philosopher can take a 
range of positions on whether such “quasi-beliefs” denote properties.  Perhaps these “quasi-
beliefs” denote robust properties or perhaps they may denote non-robust properties.  There 
is a range of options here, and the position one takes regarding these options is not settled 
simply by claiming that moral attitudes consist of desires alone.  Insufficient thought has 
been given to the array of positions in logical space.     
 In light of this consideration of the central metaphysical and psychological thesis of 
expressivism, it ought to be clear that there is no incompatibility between minimalism and 
these theses.   
Can this Dispute Be Resolved? 
It is possible that at this point in the debate, due to the fact that expressivists have 
traditionally assumed that moral utterances are incapable of being true or false, a philosopher 
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could deny that the position I sketched above is in fact an expressivist position. One would 
have to ask at this point whether this is a substantial dispute regarding the motivations 
behind expressivist theories, and the details of the theory as spelled out by its proponents, or 
whether this is a purely verbal dispute about the proper use of the philosophical term 
‘expressivism.’   
Such a philosopher might present a convincing reason for thinking that the position 
I have sketched above is not an open option.  If this were to happen, such an argument 
would be an argument about the substance of the issue, and would not be a purely verbal 
dispute.  If, on the other hand, a philosopher does not give a reason to think that this 
position is not an open option, and merely insists on a certain restricted use of the 
philosophical term ‘expressivism,’ then this philosopher making a purely verbal point.  If this 
were to happen, I would simply cede the term ‘expressivism’ to my opponent.  My concern 
in this paper has been to discuss the relationship between deflationary and minimalist 
theories of truth and a metaethical account of the kind proposed by Stevenson, Gibbard, 
Blackburn, and other philosophers.  If necessary, I could phrase the question posed in this 
paper as the question of whether an account of the kind presented by these philosophers is 
consistent with deflationism and minimalism.  Another approach, proposed by Horwich 
(1993), would be to suggest that an account of this kind is a revision of expressivism, a 
revision that has advantages over its traditional expressivist predecessors. Either strategy, it 
seems, would successfully answer this worry.  The most reasonable formulation of an 
expressivist theory of ethics would embrace a minimalist account of truth, and it ought to be 
clear that none of the incompatibilist arguments would successfully prevent the marriage of 
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